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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws: Foreign exchange: Blocked marks.-The German De-
visen (Foreign Exchange Laws) have brought about an anomaly in foreign
exchange-the blocked mark. As distinguished from the free mark, the
blocked mark has no market value as foreign exchange without the consent
of the German Foreign Exchange Board.'
In several recent cases, this anomalous mark coupled with the rule of law
that our courts can give effect to an obligation only by a judgment stated
in terms of American currency,2 has caused our courts no little difficulty.
The current problem may be briefly stated. Jewish refugees purchased steam-
ship tickets with blocked marks in Germany. The outbreak of war in 1939
caused these steamship companies to cancel sailings. After reaching America
by some other means, the refugees sue, in this country, the local offices of
these foreign companies to recover, in dollars, the value of the unused
tickets. Two distinct courses of action seem to be available to them: a con-
tract action based on the refund clause of the ticket, and a quasi-contract
action based on the theory of unjust enrichment.
Refunding means to give back, to repay, or to restore.3 It can be made in
kind or by returning the value of that which was originally given. It requires
no extended discussion to demonstrate the futility of a refund in kind-in
blocked marks-to a Jewish refugee who cannot possibly return to Germany,
the only place where blocked marks have any value.4 Consequently, the
refund in kind is refused. But when suit for refund is then brought to
recover the value of the blocked marks, we have the problem of valuation,
which is the heart of the difficulty, squarely before us. How can blocked
marks, having no exchangeable value, be translated into dollars? The ques-
tion answers itself. In suits brought under the refund clause, the plaintiff
wins an empty victory-a judgment for "no dollars and no cents." The case
of Steinfink v. North German Lloyd Steamship Co.,5 where the action was
to recover $627.00, the equivalent of German marks paid in Austria, illus-
trates the legal correctness of such a result.
1Pan-American Securities Corporation v. Fried. Krupp A., 169 Misc. 445, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 933, 998 (Sup. Ct. 1938) aff'd, 256 App. Div. 955, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 205 (2d Dep't
1939); Freund, Blocked Currencies (1940) 4 MoD. L. REv. 148.
21 SEDWICicK, DA1fAGEs (9th ed. 1912) § 273.
3
WEBsTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1931).
4The steamship companies usually allege and prove that they have at all times been
ready, able, and willing to make a refund in kind by crediting a blocked mark account in
Germany. What would be the effect of a payment of the blocked marks, admittedly due,
into court in Germany? In Zimmermann v. Sutherland, 274 U. S. 253, 47 Sup. Ct. 625
(1927), plaintiffs, as depositors, sued an Austrian bank (whose property in this country
was seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act) to recover the amount of a debt
due and payable in Austria. Held: payment into court in Austria, which by that law
operated as a discharge, is a complete defence. If a similar procedure and law were in
effect in Germany we should have another challenge to ignore the German law in the
interest of simple justice.
527 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1st Dep't 1941), 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 773. Compare Rosen-
bluth v. Holland American Line, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 922 (lst.Dep't 1941), 1941 Am. Mar.
Cas. 772, decided the same day, where, on substantially the same facts, recovery was
allowed. There was, however, a dissenting opinion based on the Steinfink case.
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Even if it be conceded that the Devisen are opposed to the public policy
of this country on the ground that they are confiscatory and discriminatory 6
the problem of valuation persists. A result contrary to the Steinfink case
was reached, however, in Kassel v. Holland-American Line,7 where the court
allowed recovery stating that: "Since demand for refund was made by the
plaintiff in New York, the internal laws of the German reich have no
application, for all matters connected with the performance of a contract are
regulated by the law of the place where the contract is to be performed."18 The
court evaded the valuation of the blocked marks by ignoring the German law
which made them different from free marks.9 Since the defendant com-
panies are willing to perform under the refund clause of the contract, it
would seem, however, that as a matter of'strict law, the plaintiff who grounds
his cause of action on the refund clause of the contract is properly denied
any substantial recovery.10
In view of the severity of those decisions which deny recovery on con-
61n the Steinfink case, mspra note 5, at 920, the court held that the Devisen were "not
confiscatory in their nature at all, but are regulatory of foreign exchange transactions ...
the regulations apply to all non-residents and foreigners, and our courts cannot disregard
them." The recent "gold clause" cases which followed the Joint Resolution of Congress
taking this country off the gold standard, are ample authority for the point that the
courts of one country cannot disregard the foreign exchange regulations of another sover-
eign. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U. S. 247, 59 Sup. Ct. 847 (1939) ; Bethle-
hem Co. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 307 U., S. 265, 59 Sup. Ct. 856 (1939) reversing,
279 N. Y. 495, 18 N. E. (2d) 673 (1939); Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 55
Sup. Ct. 428 (1935).
724 N. Y. S. (2d) 450 (2d Dep't 1940), 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 335.
8Union National Bank of Chicago v. Chapman, 169 N. Y. 538, 543, 62 N. E. 672, 88
Am. St. Rep. 614 (1902), 57 L. R. A. 513 (1903); In Lann v. United Steel Works
Corporation, 166 Misc. 465, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 951 (Sup. Ct. 1938), the court, in dealing
with a multiple currency bond, construed it to be a multiple performance bond, and since
performance was demanded in Dutch guilders, the Devisen were, of course, not applic-
able. Compare cases cited supra note 6, for the United States Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of United States multiple currency bonds. That the performance of an obliga-
tion can be separated from the obligation itself is a controverted point of law. Even if
such a division can be made, "the point at which initiation ceases and performance begins
is not a point that can be fixed by any rule of law of universal application to all cases."
RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1934) §§ 332, comment c, 358. See generally, 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935) §§ 332.1 et seq.; Beale, What Law Governs the Val-
idity of a Contract (1909) 23 HAv. L. REV. 1, 79; Lorenzen, Validity and Effects -i
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 565, 655.
Olt then followed the established rule in New York which holds that the judgment
is measured by the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the defendant's breach.
Accord: Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N. Y. 37, 138 N. E. 497 (1923). Contra:
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 424. For an excellent discussion concerning
the problem of the possible times at which the rate of exchange may be computed, see
Foreign. Moneys in Domestic Courts (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 360, with the present New
York law discussed at page 365.
1OA novel approach was suggested by the trial court in Zimmern v. Holland-American
Line, 177 Misc. 91 (Mun. Ct. 1941) reversed per curiam, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 824 (1st Dep't
1941): "The court assumes that it (the defendant company) maintains a system of
.credits and debits among its various offices. . . .The refund presents a simple process
of bookkeeping ... This simple solution obviates the necessity of taking any marks out
of Germany, and thus makes unnecessary the consideration of what effect the laws and
regulations of that counrty have on the value of marks taken therefrom."
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND. COMMENTS
tract grounds, a more appropriate situation for the application of the doctrine
of unjust enrichment11 would be difficult to find. The applicability of this
doctrine is, however, more apparent than real because the plaintiff is once
again confronted with the laws of Germany. "The law of the place where
benefit is conferred determines whether the conferring of the benefit creates
a right against the recipient to have compensation."' 2 In Branderbit v. Ham-
burg American Line,13 the lower court allowed recovery stating: "There is no
showing by the defendant that under similar circumstances a judgment could
not be rendered in Germany." The conflict of laws obstacle thus eliminated,
recovery by the plaintiff readily followed.' 4 That the right to recover under
the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment should be governed by the law of
the New World Order must sound like a contradiction in terms to refugees
seeking justice in American courts. It seems unfortunate that the law's em-
phasis on where the benefit was conferred should operate to exclude a re-
covery based solely on who was unjustly enriched.
These intricacies of legalism obscure the realities of the situation. Inter-
woven with the legal theory, rules of law and technicalities which these cases
present is a tale of persecution, of exile-a bitter condemnation of Hitler's
Germany. Even before the United States declared war against the New
Order, the Devisen had been judicially condemned as "highly repugnant to
our sense of honor and decency, and reflect financial sadism at its worst."' 5
One court expressly stated its major premise as follows: "We must recognize
that unless the plaintiff has a remedy here, he has none."' 6 With these con-
siderations in mind, the extent to which legal formalism will be warped,
or even scrapped, to bring about a just result is an unknown quantity. Since
11Pink v. Title Guarantee and Trust Company, 274 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E. (2d) 321
(1937) ; Miller v. Schloss, 218 N. Y. 400, 407, 113 N. E. 337 (1916) ; 1 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACT (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) § 3.
12RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT oF LAWS (1934) §§ 452, 453; 2 Br.zL, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1935) § 452.1. In American Union Bank v. Swiss Bank Corporation, 40 F. (2d)
446 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), the court stated at 450: ". . . the relief sought is restitution
because of the failure of the defendant to perform, and for that reason the law of New
York, where the consideration was paid, governs."
1329 N. Y. S. (2d) 488 (Mun. Ct. 1941) reversed 31 N. Y. S. (2d) 588 (2nd Dep't
1941) on the ground that "Since the action is between German Nationals on a contract
performable in Germany, the so-called Devisen Laws of that country must be held to
apply, however objectionable we may consider them."
' 4 There is no problem of evaluating the consideration paid. The quasi-contractual
implied-in-law theory of recovery is concerned with a result. One person is benefited
unjustly at the expense of another under such circumstances that the law implies an
obligation to pay. Whether the enrichment is the result of services, goods, or money
is not material. The steamship companies have benefited unjustly to the extent of the
value of one unused passage. The value of one second-class passage from Germany to the
United States on a certain ocean liner is not difficult to compute. How many dollars
would have bought the same passage on the same boat on the day when blocked marks
instead of dollars were used as a medium of exchange? The defendant companies cannot
be heard to complain that such a valuation is arbitrary because such a computation uses
the company's own figures as a standard.
1 5Pan-American Securities Corporation v. Fried. Krupp A., 169 Misc. 445, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 993 (Sup. Ct. 1938) aff'd, 256 App. Div. 95, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 205 (2d Dep't 1939).
16Branderbit v. Hamburg-American Line, mupra, note 13.
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the outbreak of war between the United States and Germany, this pre-war
judicial condemnation of the Devisen is strengthened by our official political
condemnation of the concepts of morality and justice which are symbolized by
the swastika.17 In the present situation we shall no doubt ignore the
German law.
Douglas S. Moore
Equity: Power of a federal court to stay proceedings in a state court.-
The Supreme Court of the United States has denied the federal courts power
to stay proceedings in a state court even though the claim in the state action
has been previously adjudicated in a federal court.' In the two cases before
the Supreme Court, injunctions had been granted by the district courts and
affirmed by the circuit courts of appeal on the ground that such injunctions
were proper where "necessary to preserve to litigants the fruits of or effectuate
the lawful decrees of the federal courts."' 2  In both cases the state suits had
been started by plaintiffs who were attempting to retry issues adjudicated
against them in the federal courts.
In Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company,5 Toucey, a citizen of
Missouri, brought suit in a Missouri state court against the insurance com-
pany, a New York corporation. The purpose of the suit was to have an
insurance policy issued by the defendant reinstated. Toucey alleged an injury
within the terms of the policy and that the policy had been wrongfully
cancelled by the insurance company. On the grounds of diversity of citizen-
ship, the defendant had the case removed to a federal district court for
Missouri, where both issues were decided against the plaintiff. Later, to
avoid diversity of citizenship, Toucey assigned his claim to one Shay, a resi-
dent of the District of Columbia. Shay started suit in a Missouri state court
and the insurance company filed a "supplemental bill" in the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri to have the proceedings in the state court enjoined.
In the second case,4 the bridge company, a Delaware corporation, had
executed a deed of trust, conveying all its property to secure a bond issue.
17It is well established that the principles of comity are political rather than legal in
nature. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. Ct. 139 (1895) ; The Nereide, 9 Cranch
388, 433 (1815); 1 BEALE, CoNrLicr OF LAws (1935) § 6. For an extensive treatise
dealing with the history, nature, and scope of the doctrine of comity, see STORY, CON-
rLIcT- OF LAws (8th ed. Bigelow, 1883) §§ 32-38, 241-259.
'Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company, 314 U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 139 (1941);
Phoenix Finance Corporation v. Iowa Wisconsin Bridge Company, 314 U. S. - , 62
Sup. Ct. 139 (1941) Southern Railway Co. v. Painter, 314 U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 154
(1941) (consideration of this last case is omitted). In the first two cases Mr. Justice
Reed gave a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts con-
curred. There was no dissent in the Southern Railway Co. case as the federal court
trying the original suit had not issued a decree to be protected by injunction.2Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Company, 112 F. (2d) 927 (C. C. A. 8th 1940).




The trustees, an Iowa corporation and a Wisconsin citizen, filed a bill of
foreclosure in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa. A stockholder of the bridge company intervened as a party de-
fendant, contending that the bond and mortgages were fraudulent and
without consideration. The court found the latter to be true and denied fore-
closure. The Phoenix Finance Corporation then instituted five separate suits
against the bridge company in the Delaware state courts. The bridge com-
pany filed a "supplemental bill" in the federal district court of Iowa alleging
that the issues involved were res judicata by virtue of the federal court's
decision and asking that the defendant. be enjoined from prosecuting his suit
in the state court.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the injunctions should not be granted,
based its decision on a literal interpretation of section 265 of the Judicial
Code,5 which forbids a federal court to grant an injunction "to stay the pro-
ceedings in any court of a state, except in cases where such an injunction
may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." The
dissenting justices contended that the "relitigation" cases were an exception
to the statutory prohibition and cited several cases in support of their
position.6
Despite the fact that the numerical weight of authority was with the
dissenting justices, both policy and principles of equity favor the majority
opinion. It has been a policy of the Supreme Court to prevent any undesira-
ble and avoidable conflict between the federal and state courts.7 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the cases in which there is a jurisdictional
conflict over a res,8 and which are an exception to Section 265, are in
furtherance of this policy.9 To permit the federal court to enjoin a pro-
ceeding in a state court simply because the issue had already been tried in
a federal court, would cause needless and serious friction between the two
judicial systems.Y0 It would be giving the federal courts the absolute authority
536 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1926). "The writ of injunction shall
not be granted by any court of the United States to stop proceedings in any court of a
state, except in cases where such an injunction may be authorized by any law relating to
proceedings in bankruptcy."6Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 14 Sup. Ct. 136 (1893) ; Looney v. Eastern Texas
R. R. Co., 247 U. S. 214, 38 Sup. Ct. 460 (1917) ; Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,
255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1920).
7Oklahoma Packing Co., v. Gas Co. 309 U. S. 4, 60 Sup. Ct. 215 (1939); Kline v.
Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 (1922).5Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 235, 43 Sup. Ct. 79, 82 (1922).
"The rank and authority of the [federal and state] courts are equal but both courts
cannot control or possess the same thing at the same time, and any attempt to do so
would result in unseemly conflict. The rule, therefore, that the court first acquiring juris-
diction shall proceed without interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule
of right and of law based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or potential,
does not exist, the rule does not apply. Since that necessity does exist in actions in rein
and does not exist in actions in personam, involving a question of personal liability only,
the rule applies in the former but does not apply in the latter."
9Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 314 U. S. - , 62 Sup. Ct. 139, 144 (1941);
LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1929) § 988.
10There are several historical reasons advanced for the statutory prohibition preventing
the federal courts from enjoining the proceedings in a state court. Several of these are:
19421
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to determine whether and to what extent their decrees were res judicata
without letting a state court in which such decree was pleaded examine
its effect.
Since, under the rule pronounced in Erie v. Thompkins, 11 -both the state
and federal courts will apply state law, there is no reason why the decision
of the first court, state or federal, should not be conclusive of the same issues.
If the case is tried first in a federal court, the state court will recognize
the decree of the federal court as res judicata.
12
In reaching its decision the Court did not concern itself with the question
of the adequacy of the legal remedy. It could have refused equitable relief
in the two cases before it on the ground that the legal remedy was adequate.
By Section 267 of the Judicial Code13 if there is a plain, adequate, and
complete legal remedy, there will be no equitable relief.14 There was an
adequate legal remedy in both cases involved. The issues were adjudicated
in the federal courts and those decisions will be recognized as conclusive
and binding as between these parties in a state court. 5 Thus the decree of
the federal courts in each of the original suits could have been pleaded as
res judicata of the issues before the state courts. If for some reason this
proved ineffective, the 'injured party might be able to get a review of his
case by the United States Supreme Court, as the pleading of a federal decree
raises a federal question.' 6 Mere inconvenience or expense are not of them-
selves sufficient to make inadequate what would otherwise be an adequate
legal remedy. It must be that the relitigation in the state court would cause
the defendant in that action irreparable injury.' 7  Nor will the likelihood
to prevent unseemly conflicts between the two judicial systems, Simon v. Southern Rail-
way, 236 U. S. 115, 123, 35 Sup. Ct 255, 258; to relieve the federal judges of some of
their burdensome duties; and the prevailing prejudices against an extension of equity
jurisdiction. On the general subject, see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 345, 347; Talyor and Willis, The Power of Federal Court to
Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169.
11304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
12Wade v. Clower, 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927). Williamson-Halsell-Frazier Co.
v. London, 154 Okl. 24, 6 P. (2d) 671 (1932) ; Gedrates v. Carrol, 247 Mich. 141, 225
N. W. 625 (1929).
1336 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1926).
141n interpreting this section it has been held by the federal courts that "adequacy of
remedy" refers to the adequacy of the remedy in the federal courts, without regard to
what remedies may exist in the state courts. National Surety Company v. State Bank of
Humboldt, Nebr., 120 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th 1903): Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123
Fed. 506 (C. C. D. Del. 1903) ; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad, etc., Commission, 280
Fed. 387 (D. Minn. 1922).
15Wade v. Clower, 94 Fla. 817, 114 So. 548 (1927) ; Williamson-Halsell-Frazier Co. v.
London, 154 Okl. 24, 6 P. (2d) 671 (1923) ; Gedrate v. Carroll, 247 Mich. 141, 225 N. W.
625 (1929).
16By pleading a federal decree as res judicata in a state suit a federal question is raised
that can be reviewed in the Supreme Court under Section 237 (b) of the Judicial Code.
43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b) (1926). Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191
U. S. 499, 24 Sup. Ct. 154 (1903); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 59 Sup. Ct. 134
(1938); Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers Union Slaughter House Co., 120
U. S. 141, 7 Sup. Ct. 472.
17Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023 (1912); Mason v. Harlow, 84 Kan.
277, 114 Pac. 218 (1911); Winch's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 424 (1869). LAURENCE, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (1929) §§ 986-991.
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that another court will act erroneously give ground for injunctive relief.18
In basing its decision denying the injunction power in the "relitigation"
cases, on Section 265 of the Judicial Code, the Supreme Court has ended
the doubt and ambiguity that had existed as to the effect of Section 265.'9
Richard E. Macey
Federal Employers Liability Act: Injunctions: Forum Non Conveniens.
-The Baltinore and Ohio Railroad Company v. Frederick Kepner, 314
U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 6, 10 U. S. L. Week 4011 (1941) involved the power
of a state court to enjoin a resident of the state from suing under the federal
Employers' Liability Act in a federal district court in another state. Kepner,
an Ohio resident, was injured in Ohio, but brought his action against the
railroad in the Eastern District of New York where the B & 0 was doing
business. The railroad then sought in an Ohio court to enjoin this action,
showing that courts were available near the residence of Kepner; that the
court chosen was seven hundred miles distant; and that the cost of trans-
porting twenty-five local witnesses would be four thousand dollars. The
Supreme Court held that the Ohio court could not enjoin Kepner from suing
in the district court.
The venue provision of the Employers' Liability Act reads:
"Under this chapter an action may be brought in a District Court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in
which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing
business at the time of commencing such action."1
The Court reviewed the legislative history of this provision and found that
it was to relieve the plaintiff of the necessity of suing in the district of the
residence of the defendant as required by the general venue provisions at that
time. Mr. Justice Reed concluded that Congress meant to give plaintiffs
an absolute right to sue in any of the districts named, without interference
by state laws or courts, and said that if this result was unjust, it was for the
legislature to remedy.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting pointed out that this is a novel con-
struction of a venue statute; that courts of equity have long enjoyed oppres-
sive foreign suits; that the doctrine of forum iton conveniens is well recog-
nized; that state courts have power to enjoin actions in federal courts; and
concluded that the right given in the venue statute should be qualified by
these accepted powers.
Both opinions discussed the cases beginning with Davis v. Farmers Co-
18Meredith v. Crowder, 81 Ind. App. 221, 142 N. E. 876 (1924); Wolfe.v. Burke, 56
N. Y. 115 (1874) ; Wallack v. Society for Reformation, etc.. 67 N. Y. 23 (1876).
100n the converse problem of a state court enjoining the proceedings in a state
court, see Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HARv. L REv. 345,
348; (1937) 16 N. C. L. REv. 405; (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 343.
136 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1928).
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operative Equity Co.," where it was held to be an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce for a state statute to allow a railroad to be sued in a
state where it had no lines and maintained only a soliciting agent upon whom
service was made. Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed to these cases in his dis-
sent merely to show that a plaintiff's right to bring his action in the places
specified in the Employers' Liability Act may be modified for reasons of
convenience and expense. The majority apparently discussed these cases to
show that there was no unconstitutional burden on the facts of this case.
3
Does this mean that if the Court in the Kepner case had found an improper
burden under the Davis theory, it would have allowed the injunction ?4 This
would not seem to be proper. The power of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce is limited only by the Constitution; and, subject only to these limi-
tations, such as the Fifth Amendment,3 a federal statute may burden as well
as promote interstate commerce.6 Thus, if the federal government gives a
court jurisdiction to hear a case, does not this exclude any question of a
burden on interstate commerce?7
The decision in the Kepner case is, on its facts, a decision that a state court
cannot enjoin a person from bringing an action in federal court under the fed-
2262 U. S. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. 556 (1922).
3See Hoffman v. Missouri ex. rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 485 (1927);
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152
(1931) (which seems to say that a railroad may be sued in any state in which it has
lines and is doing business, without an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
In International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transportation Co., 292 U. S. 511, 54 Sup. Ct.
797 (1933), Mr. Justice Cardozo reviewed this doctrine, while holding that a steamship
company could be sued in a state where its ships made regularly scheduled stops.
4In Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492, 49 Sup. Ct. 207 (1928), a
state court was permitted to enjoin an action under the Federal Employers Liability Act
in another court of the same state, where the first action was an improper burden on in-
terstate commerce under the Davis doctrine.
5U. S. CoNsr. AmmND. V, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
6Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (U. S. 1824) ; United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U. S. 144, 58 Sup. Ct. 778 (1938) ; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379
(1939) ; United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451 (1941).
7The Supreme Court has not distinguished between actions brought in state courts
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and other actions against railroads in state
courts, in applying the Davis doctrine, although the state courts get jurisdiction from the
federal statute. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1928) provides: ". . . The
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent
with that of the courts of the several States .... " The Davis case did not arise under
the act, and when the Supreme Court had before it in Hoffman v. Missouri ex. reL.
Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 Sup. Ct. 485 (1927), and Denver & Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Co. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 Sup. Ct. 152 (1931), actions in state court under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Davis doctrine was applied with no discussion
of the fact that the courts got jurisdiction by an act of Congress who are free to burden
interstate commerce. Is the answer that Congress impliedly qualified the grant of
jurisdiction? Or is this another place where due process of law comes to the iescue?
[Vol. 27
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eral Employers' Liability Act. This is a perfectly sound result. There is a
well established distinction between suits in rein which may be enjoined by
the state or federal courts and actions in personam which may not be.8
The danger in the decision lies in the broad language used by the Court
and the statement that: "[The] privilege of venue granted by the legislative
body which created this right of action can not be frustrated for reasons of
convenience or expense."9  Will the decision be considered an authority for
the proposition that a district court cannot refuse to take jurisdiction of a
case arising under the Act? This would not seem to be a proper conclusion,
although even before the Kepner case was decided some courts had held that
they could not refuse jurisdiction when an action was brought in one of the
districts which the Act enumerated.10
An examination of these cases reveals that they rely on a statement in the
Secohd Employers' Liability Act Cases" that when a court has jurisdiction,
it must exercise it. And when one case held that a district court could not
refuse jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens, relying on the
Second Employers' Liability Act Cases, this was authority for the next case,
and so on, until quite a respectable body of authority was built up. It was
doubtless this line of authority that caused the defendant in the Kepner case
to apply to an Ohio state court for an injunction rather than applying to the
federal district court in the Eastern district of New York to dismiss the
suit.
But the Supreme Court has qualified this broad statement which was
made when a state court was trying to refuse jurisdiction, not on the ground
of forum non conveniens, but on the ground that it did not approve of the Act.
For instance, in Canada Malting Co., Ltd. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,1
2
a district court was held to have properly refused to hear a case which arose
out of a collision in United States waters between two Canadian owned and
registered vessels; and in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Company of New York'5
the court said,' 4 "But it safely may be said that jurisdiction will be declined
whenever considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice point to the
courts of the state of the domicile as appropriate tribunals for the determina-
tion of the particular case." Also, a district court was directed by the Su-
preme Court to surrender jurisdiction of a suit for receivership of a building
8Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 (1922) ; Penn General
Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, 294 U. S. 189, 55 Sup. Ct. 386 (1935) ; Princess Lida v.
Thompson, 305 U. S. 456, 59 Sup. Ct. 275 (1938). See note (1942) 27 CORNELL L. Q.
270.
9314 U. S. - , 62 Sup. Ct. 6, 10, 10 U. S. L. Week 4011, 4012.
10Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th 1924); Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran,
56F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A. 6th 1932).
11233 U. S. 1, 55, 32 Sup. Ct. 169, 178 (1911).
12285 U. S. 413, 52 Sup. Ct. 413 (1932).
13288 U. S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295 (1933), holding that a district court in New York
correctly refused to hear a stockholders' suit against a New Jersey corporation, which
involved a question of New Jersey law which had never been passed on in New Jersey.
There was a strong dissent in the case, which, however, did not question the doctrine
of forum non. conveniens, but only its application to the particular facts of the case.
14288 U. S. 123, 131, 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 298 (1933).
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and loan association upon petition by a state officer which showed that the
state had a specific statute for liquidating such associations.15 In Massachw-
setts v. Missouri,16 the Supreme Court refused to hear a suit for inheritance
taxes against a state and individuals by another state, saying,17 "We have ob-
served that the broad statement that a court having jurisdiction must exercise
it, is not universally true but has been qualified in certain cases where the
federal courts may, in their discretion, properly withhold the exercise of juris-
diction conferred upon them, where there is no want of a suitable forum."
The Court held in Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co.' s that a state court may refuse to take jurisdiction of an action under the
Employers' Liability Act on the ground of forum non conveniens, when local
law makes it a policy to refuse actions between these parties on any cause of
action, and where the court is not simply discriminating against suits under
the Act, as was the court in the Second Employers' Liability Act Cases.
Thus, it would seem'that the statement in the Kepner case that the jurisdic-
tion given the district courts in the Employers' Liability Act is mandatory was
both unnecessary to the decision and unfounded on authority. And as a
matter of policy, why should district courts, such as that for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York in the Kepner case, be forced to take actions which are
apparently brought there solely with the hope of a larger recovery when there
is an adequate and more convenient court open to the suit ?19
Kenneth A. Tifft
Quasi-Contracts: Substantial Performance: Recovery for benefits con-
ferred despite default. -The case of Cassino v. Yacevich, 261 App. Div. 685,
27 N. Y. S. (2d) 95 (3d Dep't 1941), raises anew the question of the
adequacy of the test of "substantial performance" as a basis for relief to a
person who has only partly performed his contract. The case involved an
action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, in which the referee found: (1) that
the contract had been substantially performed in good faith; (2) that the
enumerated defects were not so pervasive, that they did not constitute such
deviation from the general plan of work, and that they were not so essential
that the object of the parties, in making the contract, could not be accom-
plished; (3) that 22 items of the work pervading the whole job, amount-
ing to $1372, a value in excess of 242%o of the contract, were improperly
performed.
In view of the 24y2 % defect, the Appellate Division condemned the find-
ings of the referee as inconsistent as a matter of law. On the record, the
15 Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 55 Sup. Ct. 380 (1935).
16308 U. S. 1, 60 Sup. Ct. 39 (1939).
17308 U. S. 1, 19, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 43 (1939).
18279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355 (1929).
1-9 Since there is no provision for changing venue from one district court to another,
a district court, in a case where the Statute of Limitations had run after the start of the
action, might condition its refusal to take jurisdiction upon the defendant's agreeing not
to plead the statute.
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court declared' the question of substantial performance to be one of law2 into
which it might inquire.
"What constitutes substantial performance has been a fruitful source of
litigation."3 There seems to be but little agreement on what percentage of
completion of a contract is necessary to satisfy the test of "substantial per-
formance." In a recent New York case,4 it was held that a general build-
ing c6ntractor's completion of 95.47% of work contracted for did not con-
stitute substantial performance. One justice dissented because such a per-
centage of completion did not warrant a conclusion of wilful abandonment.
The dearth of agreement on what constitutes "substantial performance" will
continue as long as law suits are won or lost on the basis of convincing a
court that a mere label ought or ought not to be attached to a given transac-
tion. Perhaps the time has arrived when the test imposed by the weasel
words "substantial performance" has ceased to serve a useful purpose.
In defense of the doctrine of "substantial performance," Professor Willis-
ton says :5 "The obvious reason for enforcing the defendant's promise in
spite of plaintiff's failure to comply with an expressed condition is to avoid
the forfeiture of plaintiff's labor and materials, which would be caused by
a strict enforcement of the condition." In most contracts, payment is de-
pendent upon the condition precedent that the contract be completely ful-
filled. In this modem age, the instances of forfeiture due to failure strictly
to perform complex contracts involving large sums may well become increas-
ingly great.6 To avoid the injustice of large forfeitures requires a stronger
palliative than the doctrine of "substantial performance" has proved to be.
In the absence of some more adequate remedy, the courts should recognize
that the defendant is unjustifiably enriched and should therefore apply more
frequently the well-recognized principles of quasi-contract. 7
1261 App. Div. at 687, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) at 97.
2"Whether a contract has been substantially performed is a question of fact depending
upon all the circumstances of the case, to be determined by the trial court." Nolan v.
Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648, 650 (1882).
" . . the authorities establish that substantial performance is a question of fact, and
from the nature of the question, it must be so." Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256, 264
(1875).
3261 App. Div. at 687. Cf. Gutbro Construction Co. v. Barnber, 31 N. E. (2d) 112
(Ohio 1940), for a liberal application of the doctrine of substantial performance. Plain-
tiff won a judgment on the basis of the doctrine of substantial performance of his con-
tract. Defendant sought a reversal on grounds that the allowance of a recoupment of
almost half the contract price conclusively shows that the plaintiff had not substantially
performed. Most of the allowance of recoupment was for defective material and work-
manship. In affirming the judgment given below, the court said, "It is just as reasonable
to conclude that the court was too liberal in the allowance as to conclude that there had
not been substantial performance."
4Venmar v. Scott Realty Corp., 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 189 (App. Term ist Dep't 1940).
The court, one justice dissenting, stated that 9532% completion did not amount to stb-
stantial performance. Compare Phillip v. Gallant, supra, note 2, where 91.35% comple-
tion was held to be sufficient to permit full recovery less damages to the defendant.
53 WiLLisToN, CONTRACTS, (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson, 1936) § 805.6See Wolf, Substantial Performance of Contracts in New York (1931) 16 CORNL.L
L Q. 180.
7,, . . . the term quasi-contracts may with propriety be applied to all noncontractual
obligations which are treated, for the purpose of affording a remedy, as if they were
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The difference between the theory of quasi-contracts and the doctrine of
substantial performances is simply this: the positive approach of quasi-
contracts ascertains what benefits have accrued to the defendant because of
plaintiff's performance, and awards to the plaintiff the money value of this
benefit less any damages justly due the defendant. The vice of the doctrine
of substantial performance is the uncertainty of its limitation. It ignores the
question of benefits conferred upon the defendant, if, in the eyes of the
court, the contract has not been sufficiently carried out. What are its limits?
That has been the source of confusion. It is clear that the doctrine has often
failed to serve its, avowed purpose of alleviating forfeitures,9 and in its
shortcomings frequently has sanctioned a forfeiture for failure to merit its
label. In these cases, if the theory of quasi-contracts were applied, the doc-
trine of substantial performance would cease to be relevant. To warrant a
recovery in quasi-contracts, it is not essential that the court first find that
there has been substantial performance.' 0
Is the reason for one's failure to perform the contract always material?
Where the plaintiff has wilfully or maliciously refused to carry out the strict
terms of his contract, should a quasi-contractual recovery be denied?i"
The authorities seem agreed that a wilful defaulter must pay the penalty for
his default; for his reprehensible conduct he must lose the value of his
services rendered.12 Let us observe the curious results that such a prin-
ciple produces.
In Lynch v. Culhane,'3 the action was brought to recover an instalment,
which was due "when building is finished on outside, and all inspected for
contracts. So interpreted, the subject includes (1) judgments . . . . (2) . . . statutory
obligations . .. ., and (3) obligations arising from 'unjust enrichment,' i.e. the receipt by
one person from another of a benefit the retention of which is unjust." WooDwARD, THE
LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1913) § 1.
81d. at § 175 (2).
9 Often a contract may have been performed in all its material parts, but still the court
may refuse to find substantial performance if the incidentals are numerous. In such a
case, the plaintiff forfeits all, including the material performance. Nees v. Weaver,
222 Wis. 492, 269 N. W. 266 (1936) is a good example. Plaintiff contracted to construct
a roof over defendant's garage for $325. It leaked in seven places. The trial court
found it would cost $75 to make it water tight. Plaintiff recovered nothing and the
defendant had his roof that needed only another coat of waterproofing cement. Criticized
in (1937) 4 U. of CHi. L. ZEv. 492.
lOThe Maissachusetts rule seems to be that before there can be recovery on a quantum
meruit, plaintiff must first prove substantial performance of the contract plus an endeavor
in good faith to perform fully. Where the plaintiff intentionally deviates from specifica-
tions, some of the deviations being detrimental, others being the addition of extras, he
can recover neither for the work ordered and done nor for the extras. Andre v. Maguire,
305 Mass. 515, 26 N. E. (2d) 347 (1940).
"lSee cases cited by WooDwARD, op. cit. supra note 7, § 166 (2), p. 269. "On the other
hand, if the failure of performance was not justified, then the plaintiff could recover
nothing upon the contract. In such case, he could recover upon a quantum meruit, not-
withstanding the failure of performance without justification." Evans, J., in Gobens v.
Des Moines Asphalt Paving Co., 208 Iowa 1113, 1117, 224 N. W. 785 (1929).12 WooDWARw, op. cit. stpra note 7, § 166 (2) ff.; 3 WILLISTON, op. Cit. supra note 5,
§§ 475-77; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 357.
13237 Mass. 172, 129 N. E. 717 (1921). On rehearing, judgment was affirmed for
plaintiff, since a new jury had found that plaintiff did perform in good faith. 241 Mass.
219, 135 N. E. 119 (1922).
[Vol. 27,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
lathing." The trial of the case showed that plaintiff had wilfully departed
from his contract as to the chimney and the roof. Plaintiff abandoned any
right of action on the contract and sued in quantum meruit for the value of
work and materials. The jury returned a verdict for $1900, upon which
judgment was rendered. On appeal, plaintiff was denied any recovery. The
court declared that a wilful defaulter who departs from a term which goes
to the essence of the contract is barred from any recovery.
In Glazer v. Schwartz,14 the plaintiff-contractor sought to enforce a
mechanic's lien of $1700 for labor and materials used in constructing defend-
ant's house. The contract price was $14,700; $13,000 had been paid. The
master found that the plaintiff had deliberately omitted to furnish certain
materials specified in the contract, and that he had departed from the con-
tract in sundry details. But the referee also found that the plaintiff should
recover because he intended to perform and did substantially perform the
contract. To supply the omissions would cost the defendant $200. The value
of the house as left unfinished by the plaintiff was found to be $500 less
than it would have been if completed. The trial judge affirmed the findings
of the master, but denied the defendant affirmative relief on her counterclaim
for $700, since it was less than the $1700 due the plaintiff under the last in-
stalment. On appeal, the Massachusetts court reversed the trial court because
of the plaintiff's wilful departure from the contract. The plaintiff was not
entitled to maintain a suit either under the contract or in quantum meruit.
Due to plaintiff's wilful default, the court held that, according to the rule of
damages applicable, he shall recover nothing for value conferred, but that
defendant was entitled to $700 affirmative relief. In addition to penalizing
the plaintiff by a forfeiture of the benefits conferred upon the defendant, the
plaintiff was compelled to pay the reasonable cost of making the house con-
form to the contract plus damages. 15 Such is the extreme of judicial logic
when the right of reparation is lost sight of.
The adjudged cases in which the intention to perform in good faith,
followed by "substantial performance," is found by the trial court but which
are reversed on review, are numerous. These reversals reveal a strong dis-
taste for the existing law by the trial courts. The finders of the facts seem
to be much more sensitive to the dictates of justice and fair dealing than are
the far-removed courts of review. The latter seem to be much more inter-
ested in keeping their general rules of law free from the scourges and blem-
ishes of exceptions, which must always be made when a rigid rule does not
fit the hard case. Seemingly, the proper policy would be to cast aside the
outmoded concepts of "inviolability of contracts" and "substantial perform-
ance" in favor of the theory which recognizes "benefits conferred less
damages to the defendant." The principle of reparation more nearly meets
the requirements of the times and fully satisfies the demands of justice.16
Steven P. Vinciguerra*
14276 Mass. 54, 176 N. E. 613 (1931).
15For a criticism of the rule of damages applied, see Comment (1931) 41 YALE L. J.
143. Defendant clearly should not have been permitted to profit by plaintiff's breach of
contract. See RESTATEMENT, CoNrRAcrs (1932) comments (d), (e) to § 357.
16For analogous reasoning in the field of labor, see Laube, The Right of an Employee
Discharged for Cause (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 597.
*Third-year student, not member of QuAmRTELY staff.
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Taxation: Estate Tax: State law apportioning federal taxes invalid.--
Matter of del Drago, 278 N. Y. 61 (1941), holding invalid a state statute1
which apportioned federal estate taxes among legatees, has brought into
immediate prominence problems involved in the incidence of the federal
estate tax. Proper evaluation of the decision necessitates a brief review of its
background.
The right of the federal government to impose death taxes rests upon its
constitutional power to levy excise duties and imposts.2 The federal estate
tax was imposed first in 1916.3 Prior to that time the only federal death
duties had been emergency inheritance taxes passed because of war condi-
tions.4 But the taxation of inheritances had been a fruitful source of revenue
for the states long before the enactment of the first federal estate tax.5 The
estate tax is a levy upon the net estate before its distribution while the inheri-
tance tax attaches to the receipt of the corpus of the estate.,
Under the Internal Revenue Code, if the gross estate of a decedent exceeds
$40,000, the executor, within two months after qualifying as such, or within
two months after the decedent's death, is required to give written notice there-
1N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW, § 124. Whenever any executor or administrator or trustee has
paid a death tax under provisions of the New York law or the United States federal
estate tax, "The amount of the tax so paid, except in a case where a testator otherwise
directs in his will, shall be equitably prorated among the persons interested in the estate
to whom such property is or may be transferred or to whom any benefit accrues. Such
proration shall be made by the surrogate in the proportion, as near as may be, that the
value of the property, interest or benefit of each such person bears to the total value of
the property, interests or benefits received by all such persons interested in the estate...!
2U. S. Co T. Art. I, Sec. 8. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises .. . ; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; and to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."
839 STAT. 77 (1916), 6 U. S. ComP. STAT. 1916, c. 10A, 7364, § 6336y2a et seq.4Three such taxes previously had been levied in the years 1797, 1862 and 1898, and
repealed respectively in the year's 1802, 1870 and 1902. See, GLEASON AND OTIs, THE
LAW OF INHERITANcE TAxATioN (1925) 539 ff.
5The state of Pennsylvania was the first to enact an inheritance tax in the year 1826,
New York's original enactment was in 1885, and by 1916, forty-two of the states had
such excises. Dos PAssos, INHERITANCE TAx LAW (1895) 13 ff.; GLEASON AND OTIS,
op. cit supra note 4, at 813 ff. Under different names the inheritance tax is now a source
of revenue in almost every civilized country, and at the present time every state has some
form of inheritance taxation. Alabama, Florida and Georgia have statutes designed only
to take advantage of the deduction of eighty percent from the federal tax for amounts
paid on similar taxes under state law. See IxT. REV. CODE, § 813 (b) (1939). Ample
authority has established that the states may place conditions and exactions upon the
receipt of property from a decedent since the states are empowered to govern matters of
descent and distribution. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. 58, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900) ;
Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490 (1850); DeVaughn v. Hutchinson, 165 U. S. 566, 17 Sup.
Ct. 461 (1897) ; Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 20 Sup. Ct. 603 (1899) ; Magoun v.
Ill. Trust & Say. Bk., 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594 (1898). The fact that federal
inheritance taxes have been repealed as soon as the emergency terminated indicates that
inheritance taxes are a source of revenue tacitly reserved to the state governments.
GLEASON AND OTIs, op. cit. mtpra note 4, at 540 ff.; 4 COOLEY ON TAXATION (1924)
3446.6Knowlton v. Moore, supra note 5; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y.
488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924) cert. denied, 266 U. S. 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 225 (1925).
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of to the collector.7  The tax is due and payable fifteen months after the
decedent's death,8 unless the period for payment is extended by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue. 9
Although the final incidence of the tax is not stated in the Code itself, the
authorities have generally agreed that the federal estate tax is to be borne by
the residuary estate. 10 It is always competent, however, for the testator to
direct in his will the funds out of which the tax is to be paid." No distinction
has been made in regard to specific, general or demonstrative legacies, as none
of them is called upon to pay the federal tax so long as the residue is able to
pay it.'2 No case has been found in which the testator failed to make provi-
sion for a residuary estate.
During the ten years following the enactment of the federal estate tax in
1916, there was some dissatisfaction with the burden it put upon residuary
estates. In some instances the entire residue would be consumed by such
taxes, 13 and when a will was made long in advance of death, increasing taxes
might place upon the residuary legatee an "undue burden" not contemplated
by the testator.1 4 In 1927, the New York legislature appointed the Commis-
sion to Investigate Defects in the Law of Estates.15 As one result of its
study, the Commission found that residuary legatees were usually dependents
or near relatives. For such persons to bear all death taxes seemed unfair.' 6
The Commission proposed specific legislation whereby the state and federal
taxes would be apportioned among the legatees. 17  This plan, they reported,
would "present a fair, just and equitable method of allocation of the estate
tax, both Federal and State."' 8 The state legislature enacted this proposal in
7INT. Rav. CODE, § 820 (1939)
8 INT. REv. CODE, § 822 (a) (1) (1939).
9INT. REV. CODE, § 822 (a) (2) (1939).
10Matter of Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919) cert. denied, 250 U. S. 672,
40 Sup. Ct. 14 (1919) ; Matter of Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 162 N. E. 79 (1928) ; Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, supra note 6; Newton's Estate, 74 Pa. Super. 361 (1919).
See also Uber's Estate, 330 Pa. 417, 199 Atl. 356 (1938) (if there are several residuary
legatees, the estate tax is apportioned among them). Some courts have held that the
federal estate tax should bq paid proportionately by the legatees and those who benefit
under the will. Hampton's Adm'r. v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S. W. 496 (1920) ;
Matter of Douglass, 104 Misc. 359, 171 N. Y. Supp. 956 (Surr. Ct. 1918) ; Fuller v. Gale,
78 N. H. 544, 103 Atl. 308 (1918) ; Williams v. State, 81 N. H. 341, 125 Atl. 661 (1924) ;
Foster v. Farrand, 81 N. H. 448, 128 Atl. 683 (1925) ; but see, Amoskeag Trust Co. v.
Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N. H. 471, 200 Atl. 786 (1938) overruling the three
preceding cases.
2ly. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924); Beals v. Mageris, 307
Mass. 547, 31 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940) ; 4 PAGE ON WILLS (1941) 971. As to the New
York statute see In re Duryea's Estate, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. (2d) 369 (1938).
124 PAGE op. cit. supra note 11, at 968; GLEASON AND OTIS, Op. cit. supra, note 4, at
596. ,
13!'t re Benson's Estate, 120 Misc. 136, 198 N. Y. Supp. 663 (Surr. Ct. 1923) ; Hamp-
ton's Adm'r. v. Hampton, supra note 10.
14U. S. Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, 29 Fed. Supp. 643 (D. Conn. 1939).
' N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 519, § 3.
16 REPORTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE COMISSION (Reprint ed. 1930) 338.
17The Court's only mention of the background of this legislation is to be found in
the dissenting opinion, 287 N. Y. at 84.
'8 REPoRTS OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE CommIssI ON, op. cit. smpra note 16, at 339.
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1930 as Section 124 of the Decedent Estate Law.' 9 Thus far, at least one
other state has enacted similar legislation.2
After eleven years of apportionment of death taxes in New York, the
Court of Appeals has now determined, in Matter of del Drago,2' that Section
124 of the Decedent Estate Law violates the Constitution of the United
States in so far as it authorizes apportionment of federal estate taxes among
the legatees. The majority opinion, by judge Rippey, with Judges Finch,
Lewis, and Conway concurring, takes the position that the New York stat-
ute is repugnant to "the Federal Estate Tax Act of 1926 and amendments
thereto," 22 and that the New York legislature is powerless to regulate the
incidence of the tax in view of the uniformity23 and supremacy 24 clauses of
the Federal Constitution. The dissenting opinion by Judge Desmond, with
Chief Judge Lehman and Judge Loughran concurring, argues that Congress
is not concerned with the final incidence of the tax and that there is no conflict
between the federal and state statutes.
The majority finds the requirement for uniformity in federal excise taxes
abridged if each state may determine for itself how to distribute and appor-
tion the tax. But this criticism is based upon "inherent" rather than "geo-
graphical" uniformity, and Knowlton v. Moore,25 to which the majority fre-
quently adverts, indicates that "geographical" uniformity is the test generally
accepted.2 6 If the tax upon the transfer of decedent estates is levied at the
same rate throughout the United States, then the tax is "uniform," without
regard to the final incidence of the tax and possible variations in the appor-
tionment statutes of the states.
In urging that Congress has preempted the field of legislation here, the
majority says: "The state's right to taxation is subordinate to that of the
federal government." Any state action in this field is precluded by the fed-
eral act. Further, the state is powerless to supplement such legislation, since
the failure of Congress to be more specific "does not give consent [for state
legislation] but implies only that there shall be no interference with the fed-
eral scheme."
27
19 Snpra note 1.2 0PA. STAT. ANt. (Purdon 1937) Tit. 20, § 844. Held constitutional, In re Jeffrey's
Estate, 333 Pa. 15, 3 A. (2d) 393 (1939).
21287 N. Y. 61 (1941).
22
1 . Rnv. CODE, §§ 810 ff., and 935 (1939). The present federal estate tax is based
upon the Revenue Act of February 26, 1926, c. 27, § 301 (a), 44 STAT. 69, together
with the additional tax added by the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, c. 209, § 401, 47 STAT.
243, as amended by the Revenue Act of Aug. 30, 1935, c. 829, § 201, 49 STAT. 1021, and
the Revenue Act of Sept. 20, 1941, c. 412, § 401 (a), 55 STAT. 704.2 3U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, supra note 2.
2 4U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
25178 U. S. 41, 106, 20 Sup. Ct. 747 (1900) . " ... the words 'uniform throughout
the United States' do not signify an intrinsic but simply a geographical uniformity."
26Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 Sup. Ct. 883 (1937) ; Florida v.
Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265 (1927); HuGHES, THE FEDERAL DEATr TAx
(1938) § 13.
27287 N. Y. at 75.
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If assessment and collection of the federal tax were in question, this argu-
ment might be persuasive, but it is not a sufficient answer to the argument
that here the state statute concerns only an apportionment of the burden of
the tax after the federal government has assessed and collected it in full.
Since the states may regulate matters of descent and distribution,2s even to
the extent of levying an inheritance tax on federal bonds 29 and property de-
vised and bequeathed to the federal government, 30 it would seem that the
states should be empowered equally to enact any reasonable measure to con-
trol the apportionment of death duties after the estate tax has already been
paid to the federal government.
The majority argues that the federal policy to control the incidence of the
estate tax is established and declared both in the act itself and in the New
York decisions.31 But the Code provides only that the executor or adminis-
trator shall pay the tax and that "the tax shall be paid out of the estate before
its distribution. '3 2 The Court of Appeals has previously held that the reason
for requiring the executor to pay a tax is to "secure such payment" 33 and
obviously to facilitate it. The dissenting opinion points out that "Congress
never directed that the tax shall be paid out of the residuary estate,"3 4 and
that the federal government is unconcerned with the final incidence of the
tax. The views of the minority in this regard agree with previous judicial
opinion. In Edwards v. Slocum,"' the Second Circuit clearly felt that Con-
gress was not concerned with the final incidence of the tax.36 Decisions of
the Supreme Court and those of other Circuits contain strong intimations to
the same effect.3 7  So do a number of state cases.3 8  And textwriters have
generally supported this view.3 9
28Supra note 6.29Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829 (1900).
S0United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073 (1896).
S1Citing, Matter of Hamlin, 226 N. Y. 407, 124 N. E. 4 (1919) cert. denied, 250 U. S.
672, 40 Sup. Ct. 14 (1919); Matter of Oakes, 248 N. Y. 280, 162 N. E. 79 (1928);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N. Y. 488, 144 N. E. 769 (1924) cert.
denied, 266 U. S. 633, 45 Sup. Ct. 225 (1925).3 21NT. REv. CODE, § 826 (b) (1939).
33Matter of Gihon, 169 N. Y. 443, 62 N. E. 561 (1902) (regarding the federal
inheritance tax imposed under the War Revenue Act of June 13, 1898).
34287 N. Y. at 80.
3-287 Fed. 651 (C. C. A. 2d 1923) aff'd, 264 U. S. 61, 44 Sup. Ct. 293 (1923).
38 d., per Hough, Cir. J., at 653: "So far as the words of this statute are concerned,
the United States does not care who ultimately bear the weight of this tax; ... if the
legatees and devisees cannot agree as to the burden bearing, the state courts can settle
the matter."37See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349, 41 Sup. Ct. 506 (1921);
Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 63, 44 Sup. Ct. 291 (1924) ; Hill v. Grissom, 299 Fed.
641, 645 (E. D. N. C. 1924) ; Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F. (2d) 566, 572 (App. D. C. 1936).
38See Gaede v. Carroll, 114 N. J. Eq. 524, 533, 169 Atl. 172, 176 (1933) ; Turner v.
Cole, 118 N. J. Eq. 497, 503, 179 Atl. 113, 116 (1935); Central Trust Co. v. Burrow,
144 Kan. 79, 81, 58 P. (2d) 469, 470 (1936).
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The majority emphasizes that such statements are dicta, not holdings.
Judge Desmond admits this, but reasons that the logic of the position and th6
expressed views of members of Congress40 who enacted the statute are not
lightly to be overlooked.
The majority also argues that the testatrix had a right to rely on the federal
law fixing the burden of the federal estate taxes. It seems equally valid to
reason that she could rely on the state statute to apportion her taxes since it
had been in effect for four years when she made her will.4 '
"'The Congress has spoken,'" says judge Rippey, "'and it is our function
to interpret, not legislate' ". Yet considerations of hardship and inconven-
ience often have been considered in the interpretation and construction of
statutes. 43 The majority likewise gives little weight to the presumption that a
state statute does not conflict with the Federal Constitution.
44
The decision thus overturns a well-considered plan, approved by the state
legislature, 45 which came from a competent board duly commissioned as an
administrative adjunct to the legislature.46 Should this determination of the
question be final, more than ever before it will be of utmost importance for
attorneys to make specific provision in new wills regarding payment of death
taxes, and to re-examine all existing wills to determine if such provision has
been made. But since this controversy presents a federal question47 which
40 The Senate Committee on Finance adopted the following language of Congressman
Kitchen in its report on the bill: "We levy the tax on the transfer of the flat or whole
net estate. We do not follow the beneficiaries to see how much this one gets and that
one gets, and what rate should be levied on lineal and what on collateral relations, but
we simply levy on the net estate." CONG. REc., 64th Cong. [1916] pt. 15, at 1942.4 1 Some courts have maintained that there should be no speculation on -the intention of
the testator as to where the burden of taxes shall rest. Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass.
131, 140 N. E. 686 (1923) ; U. S. Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, 29 Fed. Supp. 643
(D. Conn. 1939).4 2Matter of Hamlin, supra, note 31, at 420.
4 3Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 508 (1894); Wilson
v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646 (1846); Blake v. National Banks, 23 Wall. 307 (1874);
United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482 (1868).4 4United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U. S. 394, 36 Sup. Ct. 658 (1916); Schwab
v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391 (1922) ; In re Mollenhauer's Will, 257 App.
Div. 286, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 619 (2d Dep't 1939).
4 5Per Foley, Surr., in Matter of del Drago, 175 Misc. 489 (Surr. Ct. 1940), at 491:
"When the section [Sec. 124 of the Decedent Estate Law] was enacted the Legislature
was presumed to have known what interpretation had theretofore been put upon the
statutes by the courts. It was charged with knowledge of existing legal principles,
which, in framing the statute, it desired to alter or improve." Surrogate Foley was
chairman of the Commission to Investigate Defects in the Law of Estates. See also,
Matter of Cole, 235 N. Y. 48, 138 N. E. 733 (1923) ; Orinoco Realty Co. Inc. v. Bandler,
233 N. Y. 24, 134 N. E. 823 (1922) ; Komada & Co. v. United States, -215 U. S. 392,
30 Sup. Ct. 136 (1909) : Caesar v. Bernard, 156 App. Div. 724 (1st Dep't 1913) aff'd,
209 N. Y. 570, 103 N. E. 1122 (1913).
4 6The Commission was composed of four members of the senate, four members of the
assembly, four surrogates and three attorneys.
4743 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 Jun. CODE 344 (1925) 11 b: "It shall be competent for the
Supreme Court, by certiorari, to require that there be certified to it for review and
determination ... any cause wherein a final judgment or decree has been rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had where . . . is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of any State on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. .. ."
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has been passed upon by the highest court of the state,48 it is probable that the
case will reach the United States Supreme Court. In that event, lawyers may
hope for agreement with the view of the minority, that the federal govern-
ment is not concerned with the final incidence of the federal estate tax so long
as the state has not interfered with the primary powers of assessment and
collection.
Tozier Bromn
Torts: Practice and Pleading: Procedural effects of res ipsa loquitur.-
In George Foltis, Inc. v. the City of New York, 287 N. Y. 648 (1941'),.
recently decided by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff sued for damages to
property in its restaurant caused by water which flowed into its premises
from a broken water main laid and maintained by the defendant city in the
adjacent roadway, about four feet below the surface.1 The trial judge dis-
regarded special findings made by the jury absolving defendant from negli-
gence in respect to care exercised in the inspection 'and laying of the pipe
and directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the rule of
res ipsa loquitur applied, and that this rule as a matter of law dictated an
inference or presumption of negligence.2 Held: Reversed and remanded to
the trial court to pass upon the motion of the plaintiff, made aft6r the jury
had returned, to set aside the findiiigs, or the motion of the defendant, made
at the same time, for judgment upon the findings.3 Although the court held
the rule of res ipsa loquitur applicable, it stated that there is no procedural
difference between a case where plaintiff relies upon the rule of res ipsa
loquitur, and one where plaintiff makes out his prima facie case by direct
evidence. In the latter situation the court may seldom direct a verdict,
though the plaintiff's evidence is not contradicted or rebutted by the de-
fendant. The question of whether the defendant was at fault in what he
did or failed to do is ordinarily one of fact to be determined by the jury,
unless the jury is waived.
It is well established that the rule of res ipsa loquitur, which has been
termed a common-sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial
evidence, 4 will be applied to a situation where the instrumentality causing the
48 CooLEy, CONsTiTuTioNAL LImiTATioNs (1927) at 34: ". . . to authorize removal
under the Judiciary Act, it must appear by the record, either expressly or by clear
and necessary intendment, that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the
State court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it might have arisen
or been applicable."
'At the trial neither the plaintiff nor the defendant produced any evidence to show
the cause of the break, although the defendant produced evidence to show that the
pipes were new and that they were carefully tested and inspected before they were
put into the ground.
2The trial court's opinion is reported in 174 Misc. 967, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 800 (1940),
affirmed-by the Appellate Division, First Department in a 3 to 2 decision, 261 App. Div.
1059, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 609 (1941).
3287 N. Y. at 657.4Gailbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234, 196 N. E. 36, 38 (1935).
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injury is within the exclusive possession and control of the defendant, and
such person has exclusive knowledge of the care or lack of care exercised in
the control and management of that instrumentality and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of events would not happen, if the defendant had
used proper care.5 Thus, if the defendant, who possesses superior knowl-
edge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence, fails to
offer any explanation of the accident consistent with freedom from negli-
gence, it is reasonable to assume that the accident arose from some negligence
on his part in respect to the duty owed to the plaintiff. 6 Since its origin, the
rule has been applied to many and varied situations. 7 The rule exists in
most American jurisdictions.8 In jurisdictions where the rule has not been
invoked, a careful analysis will disclose that the courts nevertheless permit a
finding of want of care from established facts and circumstances. 9
Many courts are in accord with the principal case in applying the rule of
res ipsa loquitur where the injury complained of resulted from a break in an
underground water main, and in holding that proof of the break constitutes
circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish prina facie that the injury was
due to the negligence of the public authorities. 10 Since Professor Wigmore
5 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416 (1913); Chenall v. Palmer B. Co.,
117 Ga. 106, 43 S. E. 443 (1903); Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86,
120 N. E. 396 (1918) ; Gailbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234, 196 N. E. 36, 38 (1935) ;
Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287, ,149 N. E. 859, 860 (1925); Griffen v. Manice,
166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630, 52 L. R. A. 922 (1901); Scott v.
London Dock Co., 3 H. & C. 596 (1865) (principle first stated) ; 9 WIGMORE, EviDENZCE
(3d ed.) § 2509, p. 377; HARPER, TORTS (1933) 183.
6 Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 287, 149 N. E. 859, 860 (1925); HARPER, TORTS
(1933) 183.7 The doctrine stems from the English case, Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng.
Rep. 299 (1883). The plaintiff had been hit on the head by a barrel of flour while
walking on the sidewalk outside of the defendant's warehouse. No evidence of how or
why the barrel had rolled out of the warehouse was produced. A non-suit for the plaintiff
was held improper. See also San Juan Light & T. Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 32
Sup. 399 (1913) (death by contact with wires) ; Lewis v. Linkett, 232 Ala. 233, 167
So. 286 (1936) (poisonous contents in a beverage bottle); Mudrick v. Market S. & R.
Co., 11 Cal. (2d) 724, 81 Pac. (2d) 950 (1938) (falling off a street car); Murden
v. Miami P. & E. Co., 113 Fla. 870, 152 So. 714 (1934) (death by automobile);
Pearson v. Butts, 224 Ia. 376, 276 N. W. 64 (1937) (shampoo in a beauty parlor);
Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport Co., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N. E. 212 (1932) (fall of an
airplane) ; Delap v. Liebenson, 190 Wis. 73, 208 N. W. 937 (1926) (stove explosion);
9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.) § 2509.8 "Both Michigan and South Carolina reject the entire doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
express terms, and say it is not to be given effect, but proceed nevertheless to apply
the principle under different names when the situation calls for it." See Prosser, The
Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936) 20 MixN. L. REv. 241, 253, and cases
there cited.
9 See footnote 8, supra. Thus it would appear that such courts had simply declined
to affix the latin label to their logical process.
1OHiggenson v. City of New York, 181 App. Div. 367, 168 N. Y. Supp. 866 (2d Dep't
1918) ; Buffums v. Long Beach, 111 Cal. App. 327, 295 Pac. 540 (1931) ; Esberg Gunst
Cigar Co. v. Portland, 34 Ore. 282 (1899); Ettlinger v. City of New York, 58 Misc.
229, 109 N. Y. Supp. 44 (App. Term 1st Dep't 1908). Contra: Terry v. Mayor, etc. of
New York, 8 Bosw. 504 (Superior Ct. 1861); Goldman v. City of Boston, 274 Mass.




has suggested as one of the requirements for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur that at the time of the injury, both inspection and user must
have been in the exclusive control of the defendant,'" there is a question as
to whether a uniform application of the rule to the water main case is proper.
Except possibly where a pipe is so ancient that corrosion should be ex-
pected, the defendant city is not obliged to rip up many miles of city streets
to reinspect water mains after sufficient inspection was made at the time of
construction. 12 Also breaks in water mains may be due to any one of
numerous causes,' 3 and if the defendant introduces proof that the accident
might equally well have happened from some cause other than negligence on
its part, the rule cannot properly be applied.14 Since the defendant city is in
a better position to offer an explanation as to the cause of the occurrence,
and since the city should not be allowed, with impunity, to withhold evidence
which it has and which the plaintiff cannot get, or can get only with extreme
difficulty, it is submitted that the rule was properly held applicable to the
situation in the principal case. The important aspect of the decision is the
clarification of the procedural effect of the rule in New York.' 5
Where proper grounds for the application of the principal of res ipsa
loquitur have been established, the plaintiff has gained a procedural advan-
tage over the defendant although the courts do not agree as to the nature of
such procedural advantage.'8 As a result of the study of the opinions, there
are discoverable four possible procedural effects of the rule:
1. The weight of authority holds that the doctrine enables the plaintiff
to make out a prima facie case.' 7 Such a case merely satisfies the plaintiff's
primary duty of producing sufficient evidence to go to the jury. The jury
119 WIGmoRF, EVmDENcE (3d ed.) § 2509, p. 377.
' 2Wimpfheimer v. City of New York, 184 App. Div. 494, 499, 171 N. Y. Supp. 701
(1st Dep't 1918) ; Farrell v. City of New York, 113 App. Div. 687, 99 N. Y. Supp. 947
(2d Dep't 1906).
1
3 Such breaks may be due to some catastrophe or extremely heavy explosion or
earth tremor. Such causes would be entirely independent of negligence on the part
of the city.
14Where the defendant offers substantial evidence in his own favor: Lawson v. Mobile
Elec. Co., 204 Ala. 318, 85 So. 257 (1920) ; Langley Bus Co. v. Messer, 222 Ala. 533,
133 So. 287 (1931); Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 173 N. E. 670 (1930);
Scarpelli v. Washington Water Power Co., 63 Wash. 18, 114 Pac. 870 (1911) ; Spaulding
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 33 Wis. 58Z (1873).
' 5The decision, it is submitted, is an answer to the stated request made in 1936
by Milton F. Rosenthal, a Research Assistant to the New York State Law Revision
Commission, when he published an exhaustive study, The Procedural Effects of Res
Ipsa Loquitur in New York (1936) 22 CORNELL L, Q. 39 in which he said at p. 63:
"Res Ipsa Loquitur is a living doctrine in the trial courts today. Justice to litigants
requires that the procedural effects of the doctrine be more fully explained by the
appellate courts."
-16See the discussion by Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936)
20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 243.
' 7 Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416 (1913) ; Hughes v. Atlantic
City and Shore R. R. Co., 85 N. J. L. 212; 89 AtI. 769, L. R. A. 1916A (1913); Ross
v. Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E. 121 (1905) ; White v. Hines, 182 N. C. 275,
109 S. E. 31 (1921); Glowacki v. Northwestern Ohio R. & P. Co., 116 Ohio St., 451,
151 N. E. 21 (1927).
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is authorized, but is not required, to infer negligence from the facts proved.
Very often this has been called the "permissible inference" theory.'8
2. Many courts have proceeded on the basis that the rule creates a pre-
sumption of negligence, which is rebuttable, and the burden of proof, in the
sense of the duty of going forward with the evidence to the extent of
definitely overcoming the presumption, shifts to the defendant.' 9 Thus, if
there is a failure by the defendant to produce evidence, the jury will be re-
quired by the court to find that the defendant was guilty of negligence.
20
By this presumption the defendant is not required to produce evidence
sufficient to decide this issue affirmatively in his favor. If, when all the
evidence is in, the question is evenly balanced, the verdict must be for the
defendant.21
3. Some courts in applying the rule, have shifted a true burden of the
proof to the defendant, thus requiring him to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was. not negligent.22 The weight of the defendant's evi-
dence is required to be greater than that offered by the plaintiff if the defend-
ant is to prevail.
4. In many of the cases examined, the courts have assumed the attitude
that the rule has no uniform procedural effect, perhaps with a view to
assigning different probability values and hence different procedural con-
sequences to the varying situations.
23
New York has never followed the rule that the burden of proof shifts to
the defendant in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been
held applicable.24 But because of the ambiguity in previous opinions, it has
been difficult to determine what the true procedural effect of the rule was
or might be.
2 5
18See generally, Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936) 20
MINN. L. REV. 241, 243; Carpenter, The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1934) 1 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 523. Cf. Heckle and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 724, 729.
19Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896).
209 WIG MRo, EVIDENCE (3d ed.) § 2490, p. 286; Heckle and Harper, Effect of the Doc-
trine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. REV. 724, 730; Carpenter, Doctrine of Res
Ipsa Loquitur (1934) 1 U. CH. L. REV. 519, 524.
219 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (3d ed.) § 2490, p. 286.
22Heckle and Harper, Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loguitur (1928) 22 ILL. L.
REV. 724, 730; Carpenter, Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1,934) 1 U. CHL L. REV.
519, 525.
23Gailbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234, 196 N. E. 36 (1935); Eaton v. N. Y. Cent.
& H. R. R. Co., 195 N. Y. 267, 270, 88 N. E. 378 (1909) wherein it was said concern-
ing the rule of res ipsa loquitur "This rule... was not the declaration of the discovery
of some new legal principle, available to a complainant to supplement the deficiency in
the required proof of the charge of negligence. The doctrine, simply, regulates the
degree of the proof required under certain circumstances."
See the discussion by Rosenthal, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New
York (1936) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 39, at 60.24Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900) ; Kay v. Metro-
politant St. Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 (1900) ; see Plumb v. Richmond, etc.
R. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 288, 135 N. E. 504 (1922) ; Gailbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230,
239, 196 N. E. 36 (1935).
25See Rosenthal, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Nrew York (1936)
22 CORNELL L. Q. 39.
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This confusion, not only in New York but in other jurisdictions as well,
has resulted from a failure of the courts to fully comprehend that the rule
of res ipsa loquitur, which is applicable to situations where the plaintiff
establishes his case by circumstantial evidence, does not add anything what-
ever to the normal deductive process in the cases; that is, that circumstantial
evidence is so significant that in the light of the given facts one might
fairly say that the defendant was at fault. Normally circumstantial evidence
is not strong enough to raise a full presumption.2 6 The trial and the
appellate courts in New York have used the terms "inference" and "pre-
sumption" indiscriminately without due regard to their precise definitions as
outlined above, and without indicating that such terms are not identical in
scope and effect. 27 Thus, where the defendant has failed to produce any
evidence after the plaintiff has invoked the rule, many cases in the appellate
courts of New York, following the "presumption theory" on the authority
of Hogan v. Manhattan Ry.,28 have affirmed the granting of a motion for
a directed verdict made by the plaintiff, 29 while others have said that the
plaintiff had merely raised a permissible inference and the jury should
decide the matter.30 Even in cases where the defendant has offered an
explanation as to the cause of the accident, some New York courts have
favored the view that the rule raises a presumption,31 while others have said
that where the rule is invoked the plaintiff merely makes out a prinu facie
case which must be left to the jury. 2 It has been suggested that non-jury
cases in New York have followed the view, which, holds that a presumption
has been raised by. the rule.33 For a full development of the difficulty here-
26See discussion by Prosser, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936)
20 MINN. L. REv. 241, 258; 1 WIGmoR, EvDENcE (3d ed.) § 25 p. 398.27Plumb v. Richmond L. & R. Co., 233 N. Y. 285, 135 N. E. 504, 25 A. L. R. 685
(1922), cited by principal case at p. 656; Cunningham v. Daily, 191 N. Y. 152, 83 N. E.
689 (1908) ; Loudoun v. Eighth Avenud R. Co., 162 N. Y. 380, 56 N. E. 988 (1900).
See Volkmar v. Manhattan Railway Company, 134 N. Y. 418, 31- N. E. 870 (1892).
28in Hogan v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 149 N. Y. 23, 43 N. E. 403 (1896), the plaintiff
proved that he was injured from the falling of a piece of iron from the defendant's
elevated railroad structure. The court held that there was a presumption of negligence,
and unless rebutted, warranted the direction of a verdict against the defendant, the ques-
tion of damages only being left for the jury.
29Moglia v. Nassau Elec. Co., 127 App. Div. 243, 111 N. Y. Supp. 70 (2d Dep't
1908); Levine v. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 134 App. Div. 606, 119 N. Y. Supp. 315
(2d Dep't 1909).
30Breen v. N. Y. etc. R. Co., 109 N. Y. 297, 16 N. E. 60 (1888) ; Maher v. Manhattan
Ry. Co., 53 Hun. 506 (1st Dep't 1889); Stallman v. New York Steam Co., 17 App.
Div. 397, 45 N. Y. Supp. 161 (1st Dep't 1897).
31Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282 (1872); Edgerton v. N. Y. & H.
R. Co., 39 N. Y. 227 (1868).32Baum v. N. Y. & Q. C. R. Co., 124 App. Div. 12, 108 N. Y. Supp. 265 (2d Dep't
1908); Schacter v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 146 App. Div. 139, 130 N. Y.
Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1911).
33Ritchie v. Sheffields Farms, 129 Misc. 765, 222 N. Y. Supp. 724 (Mun. Ct. 1927);
Loesberg v. Fraad, 119 Misc. 447, 197 N. Y. Supp. 229 (Mun. Ct. 1922) ; Freeman v.
Schultz Bread Co., 100 Misc. 528, 163 N. Y. Supp. 396 (Mun. Ct. 1917). See Rosenthal,




tofore existing in New York the reader is referred to an article by
Mr. Milton J. Rosenthal. 34
The court in the principal case, speaking through Chief Judge Lehman,
holds that there may not be a directed verdict for the plaintiff under the
rule if the defendant has introduced evidence which substantially weakens
the inference in favor of the plaintiff, even though it does not conclusively
rebutt it. The court, accepting the dictum of Judge Crane in Salomonie v.
Yellow Taxi Co.,3 5 intimates very strongly that even in a case where there
is no rebuttal of plaintiff's evidence, it may still be left to the jury to say
whether the evidence of negligence entitles the plaintiff to a verdict. The
court rather clearly intimates that the rule is only a matter of orderly de-
duction from circumstantial evidence and that the court is not authorized to
take a case from the jury which, on its facts, is debatable.3 6 The court makes
it plain that there may be a direction of a verdict where the evidence is clear
regardless of whether the rule is applicable or not.
It is submitted that the decision should be interpreted as rejecting the
doctrine of the Hogan case in view of the strong language to the effect that
the jury should have an opportunity to examine every doubtful case after
the trial judge has given a charge, in language which they can understand,
explaining how the evidence may permit an inference of negligence and why
they may reject such inference if they see fit. The decision is most help-
ful since the grounds for the application of the rule are established by
circumstantial evidence which normally raises only an inference, though
varying in force, in favor of the plaintiff,3 7 and there are possibilities of
counter inferences arising in favor of the defendant as to how the injury
occurred. Whether one such inference is more reasonable than the other
34Rosenthal, The Procedural Effects of Res Ipsa Loquitur in New York (1936) 22
CORNELL L. Q. 39.
35242 N. Y. 251, 259, 151 N. E. 442, 445 (1926). "In cases of this kind dealing with
inferences and presumption, it is the jury and not the judge which is to draw the infer-
ence and determine the effect of presumptions. It is not the accident which alone and of
itself may raise the presumption of negligence. It is the accident accompanied by all
the surrounding circumstances. The circumstances and the events leading up to the
accident may overcome any presumption of negligence which might otherwise arise.
Even when there be a presumption of negligence arising from a failure upon the part
of a common carrier to explain how an accident happened, it is for the jury to say
whether the presumption, which is only prima facie evidence of negligence, entitles
the plaintiff to a verdict. Upon a prima facie case, the jury may find for plaintiff. They
are justified at law in so finding, but they are not compelled to award damages. The
remoteness of the accident from the conclusion which a reasoning mind would draw
from the defendant's failure to explain, may always be taken into consideration. That is,
a failure to explain does not necessarily indicate negligence."
Quoted by the court in the principal case at page 657.
86The court said, 287 N. Y. at 652: "The doctrine merely means that certain occur-
rences contain within themselves a sufficient basis for an inference of negligence, and it
does not differ from ordinary cases of circumstantial evidence except in the respect that
the facts and circumstances from which the inference of negligence is drawn are imme-
diately attendant on the occurrence."3TSee discussion, Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1936) 20
MiNs. L. Rav. 241, at 259;'1 WIGuoRm, EViDENCE (3d ed.) § 25, p. 398, where circum-
stantial evidence is referred to as an inference.
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is a question that cannot be determined as a matter of law, but must be left
as a question of fact for the jury.8 The principal case gives to the rule of
res ipsa loquitur the probative effect of a permissible inference in favor of
the plaintiff which the jury in its discretion may reject or accept. This is
also the view taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in its
current term,39 reaffirning a position long held by that court.40
After this decision it should be clear that in New York the rule of res
ipsa loquitur is now nothing but a procedure for deciding certain negligence
actions. It is not an arbitrary rule of thumb which is to be given an inflexible
or unvarying application.
Earle H. Houghtaling, Jr.*
38Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416 (1913); White v. Boston and
Albany Railroad, 144 Mass. 404, 11 N. E. 552 (1887); Hughes v. Atlantic City &
S. R. R., 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 At. 769, L. R. A. 1916 A. 927 (1914).
39Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 86 L. ed. 125 (1941)
(opinion by Chief Justice Stone). Where a tank barge sank in smooth water, without
contact with any other vessel, and the cause of the accident was left in doubt, the Court
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which is an aid to the plaintiff in sustain-
ing the burden of proving breach of the duty of due care, does not avoid the require-
ment that upon the whole case he must prove the breach by the preponderance of
evidence.
40Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416 (1913).
*Third-year student, not member of the QuAR:iuy staff.
